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On April Fool’s Day of 2018, an aban-doned Chinese satellite named HeavenlyPalace fell out of orbit and plunged intothe Pacific Ocean. There’s a half millionpieces of detritus in orbit ranging in sizefrom inoperative satellites like HeavenlyPalace, which weighed nine tons, to stray
nuts and bolts. Most of this space junk stays aloft, but because it
travels at speeds six times faster than a bullet, even a small piece
can kill an astronaut or ruin a working satellite. Fortunately,
engineers have developed defenses against space junk.
“Statutory junk” is my term for the mishmash of statutory
commands to administrative agencies that have accumulated
over the decades and now are having unintended consequences.
Enforceable in a court of law, even a few words of statutory junk
can thwart a statutory purpose or impose unnecessary burdens
on the public. Unfortunately, Congress typically fails to protect
us from the statutory junk.
The Supreme Court spotted a particularly big hunk of statutory
junk in a decision rendered a few months before Heavenly Palace fell
to earth. National Association of Manufacturers v. Department of Defense
arose from the Clean Water Act’s requiring a permit from the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency or the Army Corps of Engineers
for any discharge of a pollutant, including fill, into “the waters of
the United States.” “Thewaters of the United States” clearly includes
more than just navigable rivers, but it doesn’t include backyard pud-
dles.Drawingthe linesomewhere betweenpuddlesandnavigable riv-
ers determines whether huge numbers of manufacturers, developers,
farmers, highway departments, individual homeowners, and others
must get permits. The stakes are high because the permit process is
onerous even if the activity does no significant environmental harm.
Yet, where the activity does such harm, the process is vital.
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Cleaning Out the
Statutory Junk
How can we push lawmakers to discard the legislative trash?
✒ BY DAVID SCHOENBROD
To draw this line, the EPA and the Corps jointly issued a
regulation in 2015. The question before the Supreme Court was
not, however, the validity of this regulation but rather in what
court to file the many cases challenging its validity. The choice
was between a single court of appeals or multiple district courts.
In her opinion for the unanimous Court, Justice Sonia Soto-
mayor noted powerful policy reasons favoring jurisdiction in a
single court of appeals. This choice would speed a final decision
on the validity of the regulation and avoid disputes about the indi-
vidual permits having to be litigated in two separate cases. None-
theless, the Court concluded that jurisdiction must be in multiple
district courts because that’s what the statute’s language dictated.
The same problems will likely repeat themselves when the Trump
administration promulgates its replacement of the 2015 rule.
Congress had never thought about how its jurisdictional text
would apply to a challenge to a regulation defining “the waters of
the United States.” Lawmakers could have avoided the unintended
consequences with just a few words of new text. The need for it
was apparent: the regulation had been pending at the agency
level for years and the statutory language on jurisdiction was well
known to practitioners in the field. The lawmakers’ failure to act
meant that, on top of the time that will be wasted because of the
statute’s inadvertent choice of jurisdiction, years were wasted
litigating where to file the challenges to the regulation.
As illustrated by this example, statutory junk is neither pro- nor
anti-regulatory protection. It is pro-stupid.
This article argues that elected officials in Congress and the
White House can organize themselves to protect us from statutory
junk and describes how they can do so. First, however, it discusses
why junk has become so common in administrative orbit.
THE JUNK’S CAUSE
There wasn’t much junk in the short, vague statutes of the Pro-
gressive Era. They simply told agencies in essence, “Here’s a
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problem, solve it.” In recent decades, however, Congress began
enacting a new sort of regulatory statute.
An early example is the 1970 Clean Air Act. It directed the EPA
to issue regulations sufficient to protect health from every harmful
pollutant everywhere in the United States by statutorily set dead-
lines. It, moreover, gave citizens the right to sue should the EPA fail
to carry out any of its duties. On this basis, the bill’s chief sponsor,
Sen. Edmund Muskie, claimed that “all Americans in all parts
of the country shall have clean air to breathe within the 1970s.”
In, say, 1940, a promise that the federal government could
deliver such concretely specified outcomes requiring the regu-
lation of tens of thousands of major pollution sources and
millions of minor ones would have seemed laughable. Wash-
ington in 1940 worked with carbon paper and adding machines,
but by 1970 it had Xerox machines and computers. It, moreover,
had a track record of great accomplishments: winning World War
II, inventing the atomic bomb, harnessing nuclear power, build-
ing the interstate highway system, passing important civil rights
legislation, and landing people on the Moon.
Around 1970, lawmakers began feeling pressure to guarantee
popular outcomes because voters had lost faith in the Progres-
sive Era’s promise that expert agencies given broad mandates and
insulated from politics would necessarily make correct choices.
Meanwhile, judicial protection of civil rights in the 1960s sug-
gested that the courts could protect statutorily specified rights.
Finally, the new way of legislating made life easier for lawmak-
ers. They could take credit for making the popular promise of
healthy air, but skirt the specifics of how to do so. That would
be up to the agency and would come later. No wonder the Clean
Air Act passed almost unanimously.
As it turned out, the EPA could not meet the statutory dead-
lines without imposing draconian burdens on the economy and
voters, such as taking most of the cars off the road in Southern
California. Legislators ended up blaming the agency for missing
deadlines for healthy air, and also for regulatory burdens the
EPA did impose.
Having claimed credit for the popular and shifted blame to
the agency for the unpopular, legislators came to see statutory
commands as political profit centers and so issued more and
more of them. There are, believe it or not, 940 passages in the
1990 version of the Clean Air Act that state the EPA administra-
tor “shall” do a certain task. Many of those commands must be
carried out repeatedly. The commands, moreover, are not brief.
The statute has as many words as a typical 450-page book.
Because the commands are based upon circumstances that
may have changed or understandings falsified by experience, they
often are stupid. Consider the statute’s command that sources
emitting more than “250 tons per year” of regulated pollutants
obtain a particular sort of permit requiring an arduous process.
The statute set the threshold at 250 tons so that only a small
number of big polluters such as large power plants would have to
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house gases, which get emitted in immensely larger quantities
than the previously regulated pollutants, would require permits
for so many more sources—even high schools—that the process
would grind to a halt. So the EPA decreed a special threshold
for greenhouse gases that began at 100,000 tons rather than
250 tons.
In Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, a majority of the Supreme
Court ruled the EPA cannot disregard such clear statutory text.
To avoid paralyzing the permit process, the Court interpreted the
statute to exclude greenhouse gases from the pollutants that trig-
ger the permit requirement, but nonetheless require greenhouse
gas emissions of sources to be regulated if some other pollutant
triggers the permit requirement.
One might disagree with the Court’s opinion or the agency’s
finding that greenhouse gases are a danger, but not the point that
the case illustrates: there’s junk in the statute.
Breaking the logjam / Because of the controversy over climate
change, one might understand Congress’s failure to address this
particular piece of Clean Air Act statutory junk. But that does not
explain Congress’s systematic failure to clean up statutory junk.
In the hope of getting rid of some of the junk in environmental
statutes, New York Law School and New York University School of
Law launched the “Breaking the Logjam” project in 2007 to show
Congress and the president to be elected in 2008 how to update
these obsolete statutes. None had been updated since 1990. The
project brought together environmental experts from across the
political spectrum. We focused on how to reform the statutes so
that agencies could clean the environment more cost effectively
rather than on how clean was clean enough.
The leaders of the project—Richard Stewart, former chair of
the Environmental Defense Fund; his colleague on the NYU
faculty, Katrina Wyman; and I—wrote a book, also titled Break-
ing the Logjam, stating the project’s recommendations. The book
received favorable endorsements from high environmental offi-
cials appointed by presidents of both parties.
When Stewart and I met with people from both parties on
Capitol Hill, they praised the project’s recommendations and
said they wished that Congress had already enacted them. After
all, the recommendations would produce a better environment
at less cost. Yet, they doubted that they could get them enacted.
Why? Because updating the statutes would require legislators
to take responsibility for hard choices on how clean is clean
enough. On the other hand, if they left the statutes unchanged,
they could continue to pin most of the blame on agencies and
the states for both the harm to the environment and the regula-
tory burdens.
Statutory junk is not confined to environmental legislation,
but extends to instructions to agencies on other kinds of regula-
tion. As Philip K. Howard observes in his 2014 book The Rule of
Nobody, “American democracy is basically run by dead people”
including “past generations of legislators.”
HOW TO MAKE LAWMAKERS RESPONSIBLE
FOR THE JUNK
Because lawmakers get away with blaming agencies for the harm
that statutory junk does to their constituents, making these law-
makers responsible for regulations would prompt them to pay
attention. This is an age-old problem; Harvard Law School dean
James Landis, a leading New Deal agency official, was frustrated
that legislators criticized agencies for doing what they, the legis-
lators, had created them to do. In his 1938 book The Administra-
tive Process, he wrote that for administrative officials, “it is an act
of political wisdom to put back upon the shoulders of Congress”
responsibility for “controversial choices.”
Landis proposed two ways to do this: bar any major adminis-
trative decision from going into effect until Congress passes a bill
approving it through the Constitution’s full legislative process, or
allow one or two houses of Congress, acting without the president,
to veto a major administrative decision. With either legislative
approval or legislative veto, Landis claimed, the agency would
be “the technical agent in the initiation of rules of conduct, yet
at the same time … [the elected lawmakers would] share in the
responsibility for their adoption.”
Congress included the legislative veto in dozens of stat-
utes. In 1983, however, the Supreme Court found this mecha-
nism unconstitutional because it allowed one or two houses of
Congress to take legislative action without going through the
Constitution’s full legislative process. The next year, Justice
Stephen Breyer, then a judge, wrote in his 1984 Georgetown Law
Review article, “The Legislative Veto after Chadha,” that Con-
gress could, consistent with the Constitution, use legislative
approval if it really wanted to be responsible for regulations.
His implicit point was that Congress is none too anxious to
shoulder responsibility.
Chevron / The blame for the harm from statutory junk falls not
just on agencies that apply the statutes, but also on the judges
who interpret them. Then, however, to avoid the hot seat in
many cases, judges began to cite the Supreme Court's decision
in Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council (1984) as requiring
them to go along with agency interpretations of statutes unless
the interpretation clearly contravenes unambiguous statutory
text. Chevron does give agencies some leeway to avoid statutory
junk, but it is an insufficient response.
Agencies sometimes lose despite Chevron, as National Associa-
tion of Manufacturers and Utility Air Regulatory Group demonstrate.
Even when agencies ultimately win, they and the public mustfirst
undergo years of uncertainty before administrative proceedings
and judicial review produce a definitive outcome. For exam-
ple, even though the agency did finally prevail in the Supreme
Court’s 2014 decision in EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, it took
multiple administrative proceedings and judicial reviews to win
approval of a way to interpret the Clean Air Act to skirt statutory
text not designed for the problem at hand.
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Although sometimes protecting the public from statutory
junk, Chevron helps to shield legislators from responsibility for
the junk by holding out the hope that, armed with Chevron def-
erence, federal agencies can take care of the problem. That has
the perverse consequence of further reducing the pressure on
Congress to clean up the junk.
Chevron, moreover, comes at considerable cost to the account-
ability of Congress. The nondelegation canon holds that stat-
utes should be construed, when possible, to reduce the scope of
authority delegated to agencies. But Chevron allows Congress to
delegate authority simply by writing sloppy statutes or failing to
clean up statutory junk.
The Supreme Court may end up declaring Chevron dead, but
will likely still cut agencies much slack unless there is some other
way to reduce the harm from statutory junk, such as lawmakers
bearing responsibility for the harm it does.
Attempts at responsibility / In 1995, some members of Congress
asked me to help design a bill to make legislators responsible
for regulation. I suggested legislative approval tweaked with a
suggestion by Judge Breyer that the bill include rules that would
force prompt votes on agency regulations. The rules would bar
legislators from amending the proposed regulation, limit debate,
and thwart filibusters by requiring votes by a deadline.
The bill, the Congressional Responsibility Act, began to gain
traction, at which point some lawmakers became concerned that
its passage would mean they would have to take responsibility
for hard choices. So Congress pulled a switcheroo: it passed
the sound-alike Congressional Review Act, which President Bill
Clinton signed into law in 1996. It gives legislators the option of
taking responsibility rather than forcing them to do so. They hardly ever
take that option. In the Congressional Review Act’s first 20 years,
Congress used it to negate only one regulation. Congress invoked
it infrequently because presidents are apt to veto bills negating
their appointees’ regulations and, in any event, members of Con-
gress are reluctant to cast votes on hard choices.
There was, however, a flurry of activity under the statute in
2017. Thatflurry was a function of the election of a new president
with a radically different regulatory philosophy than his prede-
cessor. The outgoing administration, assuming that its favored
candidate would win the 2016 election, neglected to take precau-
tions available under the statute that would have helped shield
its regulatory handiwork. That mistake is unlikely to be repeated.
So, after its 2017 moment in the sun, the Congressional Review
Act will again return to the shadows.
In any event, it’s a poor way to deal with statutory junk. It pro-
vides no way to improve regulations that are suboptimal because
of statutory junk or prompt the issuance of good regulations that
statutory junk stymied.
REINS / The Congressional Review Act let legislators appear to be
responsible for regulation without actually taking responsibility,
but the statute’s disuse made that pose increasingly unconvinc-
ing. To strike a more convincing pose, work
began in 2009 on a bill based upon the
Congressional Responsibility Act bill, but
with many perverse twists.
One gets a sense of the perverse twists
from its title, “Regulations from the Exec-
utive in Need of Scrutiny Act” (REINS),
which blames the executive for regulatory
burdens. Yet, the ultimate source of these
burdens is Congress, whose statutes are
structured to maximize the political advan-
tage to legislators rather than the net ben-
efit to their constituents.
In addition to Landis’s pro-responsibility process, REINS con-
tains many anti-regulatory features. It would command agencies
to reduce the cost of existing regulations to fully offset the cost
of any new regulations. So, REINS’s sponsors would shift to the
agencies blame for the cuts in regulatory protection needed to
deliver on the popular promise of limiting regulatory burdens.
Both REINS and the Clean Air Act try to promise the popular
and shift blame for the unpopular, but in response to the oppo-
site poles of the political spectrum. Thus does blame-shifting
promote polarization.
Worse still, the command in REINS to cap regulatory costs
potentially clashes with the commands in many existing statutes
to increase regulatory protection. There is no evidence that the
bill’s sponsors have thought through how these clashes should
be resolved. Years of litigation would be required to decide how
agencies should respond to such clashing commands. This would
sow uncertainty, which hurts economic growth.
Yet more uncertainty would come from another provision
of REINS that abolishes any existing regulation that Congress
does not approve within the next 10 years. This provision allows
a member to call for separate votes on any such regulation and
also for separate votes on conditions for its approval. This is an
unworkable procedure for the huge number of current regula-
tions, and so most of them will disappear, but it will be years
before business knows which ones will stay and which will go. So,
again, uncertainty would hurt economic growth.
Chevron shields legislators from responsibility for the
statutory junk by holding out hope that federal agencies
can take care of the problem. That further reduces
pressure on Congress to clean up the junk .
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The House has passed REINS legislation for many years, but
its anti-regulatory, junk-strewn twists have kept it from getting the
bipartisan support needed to get by a filibuster in the Senate. No
Democratic senatorsupports it.SoREINSlet its sponsorspretendto
wanttoberesponsiblewithouteverhavingtoshoulderresponsibility.
Responsibility for Regulation Act / Congress should take responsi-
bility by passing what I call the Responsibility for Regulation Act.
As detailed in my recent book DC Confidential, it would include
the Landis legislative approval of major regulations and Breyer’s
fast-track legislative process, but exclude the anti-regulatory
features of REINS.
It would work today even though Congress is more polarized
than it was in 1938 or 1984. The polarization is heightened by
Congress members claiming credit for popular goals but wash-
ing their hands of responsibility for specific regulatory actions.
That is how lawmakers can be for regulatory protection without
being responsible for regulatory burdens or against regulatory
burdens whithout being responsible for less regulatory protec-
tion. In contrast, if lawmakers were actually forced to vote on
concrete regulations—for instance, one that cuts pollution from
power plants by a given percentage—those who vote “Yea” would
be responsible for both cutting pollution and inflicting regulatory
burdens, and those who vote “Nay” would be responsible for both
tolerating pollution and avoiding regulatory burdens.
So, for example, Republican legislators wouldfind that voting
reflexively against climate change regulations would come at a
political cost when, according to a 2017 Rasmussen poll, “56%
of likely U.S. voters favor an EPA regulation that requires a one-
third drop in carbon dioxide emissions from power plants over
the next 13 years, while 33% oppose such a regulation.” And so,
too, Democratic legislators would find that voting for President
Obama’s Clean Power Plan would have come at an unnecessarily
high political cost because, as a result of statutory junk, the Clean
Air Act forecloses efficient ways to cut greenhouse gases. In sum,
lawmakers on both sides of the aisle would be more balanced
than their present posturing sounds.
Lawmakers’ responsibility for both regulatory costs and benefits
would trigger a series of constructive changes. Agencies, to get their
regulations approved, would propose regulations that balance
competing concerns in a way likely to garner majority support in
Congress. Lawmakers in turn would want to enable agencies to
promulgate regulations that achieve more protection with lower
burdens. To help them do so, they would want to get rid of statutory
junk. They wouldfinally have a personal political incentive to do so.
To take advantage of all these improved incentives, commu-
nication between Congress and agencies should begin before the
agency promulgates the rule. To that end, the new bill should
require agencies to alert Congress of proposals of major rules
and any way that, in the agency’s opinion, current statutes would
prevent the agency from promulgating what the agency consid-
ers to be an optimal rule. Then, at the proposal stage, legislators
could, at their discretion, hold hearings, introduce legislation, or
communicate with the agency individually or through commit-
tees. In addition, the bill should include a provision that adds an
extra 30 days to the deadline for a final roll call vote if a majority
of the agency’s oversight committee in either chamber signs a
petition calling for a hearing after promulgation.
With Congress having a real incentive and a process to deal
with statutory junk, courts should be more willing to cut back
the leeway that they give agencies.
WOULD CONGRESS EVER TAKE RESPONSIBILITY?
Although seemingly allergic to responsibility, legislators might
just enact a pro-responsibility bill. Now, as Frances Lee demon-
strates in her 2016 book Insecure Majorities, both parties “cham-
pion ‘all gain, no pain’ positions,” such as the Clean Air Act and
the REINS bill, in order to appeal to their bases, hide the harm
done to other interests, and win majorities in Congress.
Yet, this dynamic could change. One of the parties might come to
find that shouldering responsibility would appeal to centrist voters
and be more effective at winning majorities. Here’re some indicia:
■ Many voters do want elected lawmakers to take responsibil-
ity for regulations. For example, a 2017 Rasmussen poll
found that voters, by a margin of 56% to 25%, believe that
Congress should have to vote on major EPA regulations
before they go into effect.
■ Distrust of the federal government in general and Congress
in particular has reached record levels in recent years. No
wonder. Congress is supposed to compromise on the dif-
ferences among us, but its “all gain, no pain” techniques
inflame the differences and bring erratic government.
■ As the parties in Congress have grown more rabid, an increas-
ing portion of voters identify themselves as independents.
Besides, many members of Congress are not just incumbent
reelection machines. Some want to be proud of the work they
do. Some want to be part of an institution that is not despised.
Some want to be statesmen.
Regulation as usual is under threat from another direction. A
small group, the Madison Coalition, has gotten the legislatures
of 26 states to pass resolutions calling for Congress to propose a
constitutional amendment that would, in essence, put Landis’s
legislative veto into the Constitution. The support to date is still
short of what is needed to amend the Constitution, but that a
small group with scant resources has gotten so far in a few years
suggests the vulnerability of the present, responsibility-shirking
system. Still, I prefer the Responsibility for Regulation Act to
the constitutional amendment because statutes are easier to get,
easier to change, and Congress could use the act only to vote on
major regulations rather than individual cases.
I don’t know what the future will bring. But the political par-
ties in Congress may well find themselves in a race to show they
are willing to shoulder responsibility.
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